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The state is like the human body.
Not all of its functions are dignified.
Anatole France (1893)
Abstract
The possible impact of the unintended worst possible effects of the current multilateral 
WTO sponsored trade liberalisation project on Sub-Saharan Africa’s potential to realise 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the target date of 2015 is examined. The 
article shows that the WTO’s current approach to trade liberalisation is nurturing and 
strengthening economic inequalities between and within economic regions of the world 
and also between and within States themselves without taking any steps to mitigate this 
difficulty. The article recommends the integration of ILO and WTO dynamics to ensure 
human development oriented wealth maximisation under the WTO trade liberalisation 
regime. In this sense the ILO would become the broker and insurer of equality in the 
dignity of labour between Sub-Saharan African workers and other workers of the world, 
increasing thereby the chances for Sub-Saharan African States to achieve the MDGs by 
the target date of 2015.
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1. INTRODUCTION
International trade and social justice are interdependent, because they are both 
integral and critical to the raison d’être of why and how people everywhere engage in 
and conduct trade.1 The Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919) recognised this by providing 
for the creation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for the purpose of 
opposing conditions of social injustice that were linked to the industrial revolution. 
Then like now, the unbridled pursuit of economic growth had resulted in conditions 
of ‘… such injustice, hardship, and privation to large numbers of people as to produce 
unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world were imperilled’.2
However, the coupling of trade liberalisation issues with concerns of social justice 
has recently been criticised as an ambitious exercise in futility because of the two 
ideas’ apparent exclusivity. The World Trade Organization (WTO)’s primary concern 
is to maximise gross international wealth creation3 through trade liberalisation.4 
Non-discrimination of products and services from member States parties is the basic 
premise on which the system has been established. This is ensured by the requirement 
of two of its foremost principles, namely, the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and the 
Nationality Treatment (NT) principles.5
1 The contrary view is that trade issues are distinct and separate from non-trade issues. See Alvarez, 
José E. et al., ‘Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO’, American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 96, No. 1, 2002 pp. 1–4, for a thorough discussion on the exclusivity of trade issues and the 
question whether alleged linkages of trade issues with other matters are valid or not. Discussing 
the undeniable link between trade and social justice see also Dommen, Caroline, ‘Raising Human 
Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies’, 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2002, pp. 1–50. Discussing the regulation of bio-safety and 
international trade see also Qureshi, Asif H., ‘The Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety and the WTO – 
Co-Existence or Incoherence?’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 49, No. 
3, 2000, pp. 835–855.
2 See appendix to the ILO Constitution (1919) available at ILO website, www.ilo.org/global/About_
the_ILO/Origins_and_history/Constitution/lang-en/index.htm#annex (visited 20 January 
2008). See also Chigara, Ben, ‘Latecomers to the ILO and the Authorship and Ownership of the 
International Labour Code’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2007, pp. 706–726.
3 Discussing the optimal mandate of the WTO and arguing for this function to be separated from 
non-market access issues, see also Bagwell, Kyle, Mavroidi, Petros C. and Staiger, Robert W., 
‘It’s A Question of Market Access’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2002, 
pp. 56–76. 
4 Arguing that the WTO sponsored trade liberalisation project is nothing less than a convenient term 
to indicate US hegemony, see also Alston, Philip, ‘The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International 
Lawyers and Globalization’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1997, pp. 435–448, 
at p. 435.
5 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Article 1, 15 April 1994, 33 International Legal Materials 1125, 1994. This requirement applies 
also to trade in services covered by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article 
2, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 
Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 International Legal Materials 1125, 1994, 
available at: www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf (last accessed 20 January 2008). 
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But the WTO objective and modus operandi are significant for other stakeholders 
in international organisation, including the ILO that is concerned with the social 
impact of WTO policies on individuals everywhere because of its mandate to 
ensure universal social justice. Therefore, the UN as custodian of universal peace 
and security must account for the possibility, however remote, that WTO outcomes 
may adversely impact its grand strategies for peace building and peace making and 
also its aspiration to privilege, above all else, both the human rights and the human 
development agenda summed up in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
project. In contrast, the WTO agenda privileges first and foremost, the development 
of market efficiency everywhere. The push and pull factors that underpin ILO, UN, 
WTO, and other international organisations’ activities necessarily pit themselves 
along one another’s objectives in a complimentary way. Oftentimes they pit them one 
against the other. The tension created by their interaction is indicative of the absence 
of a formal hierarchy among international organisations. The consequent relational 
tensions can pour-over and threaten or actually impede the activities of one or other 
international organisation.
Neither GATT (the predecessor to WTO) nor the WTO has had a formal agreement 
with the UN. Formally, the extent of their relationship has been limited to an exchange 
of letters between the heads of these two bodies. In 1952, Eric Wyndham White 
(the first Executive Secretary of GATT) and Trygve Lie (the UN Secretary-General) 
exchanged letters that acknowledged the ‘close de facto working arrangements which 
exist between the United Nations Secretariat and the Secretariat of the Interim 
Commission (GATT)’.6 Upon the creation of the WTO on 1 January 1995, a further 
exchange of letters occurred between the WTO Director-General (Renato Ruggiero) 
See also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Article 
4, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 International Legal Materials. Examining 
the potential and actual effect on competition policy of member States parties of the WTO, see 
also Boughzala, Mongi, ‘Impact On Workers of Reduced Trade Barriers: The Case of Tunisia and 
Morocco’, International Labour Review, Vol. 136, No. 3, 1997, pp. 379–399, at p. 379. See also Lee, 
Eddy, ‘Globalization and Labour Standards: A Review of Issues’, International Labour Review, Vol. 
136, No. 2, 1997, pp. 173–189, at p. 173; Gunter, Bernhard G. and Van der Hoeven, Rolph, ‘The 
Social Dimension of Globalization: A Review of the Literature’, International Labour Review, Vol. 
143, No. 1–2, 2004, pp. 7–43, at p. 7; Servais, Jean-Michel, ‘Globalization and Decent Work Policy: 
Reflections Upon a New Legal Approach’, International Labour Review, Vol. 143, No. 1–2, 2004, 
pp. 185–207, at p. 185; and Milberg, William, ‘The Changing Structure of Trade Linked to Global 
Production Systems: What Are the Policy Implications’, International Labour Review, Vol. 143, No. 
1–2, 2004, pp. 45–90, at p. 45.
6 Letter from E. Wyndham White, First Executive Secretary, General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, to Trygve Lie, UN Secretary-General, 11 August 1952, in: UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), 57th Session, Review of the Agreements Between the United Nations and the Specialized 
Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Exchange of Letters Between the Executive 
Secretary of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Secretary-General, Letter dated 11 
August 1952, UN Doc. E/5476/Add.12/Annex I, 24 May 1974, available at: www.unsystemceb.org/
reference/system/agreements/wto_gatt_e_5476_add12_1974 (last accessed 27 January 2008).
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and the UN Secretary-General (Boutros Boutros-Ghali) in October 1995, emphasising 
the cooperative nature of their relationship. This is noted also in the UN’s General 
Assembly Resolution 322 of 12 December 1995.
Therefore, it would be helpful to commence this discussion with a brief 
characterisation of the issues in order to establish a framework for analysing the 
question of Sub-Saharan African States’ potential to achieve MDGs by the target date 
of 2015 under the current multilateral trading system.
2. TRADE LIBERALISATION AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: 
FRIENDS OR FOES?
2.1. OVERVIEW OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
By any standard, Sub-Saharan Africa is the weakest region in the world in terms 
of economic and human development. It has just over ten percent of the world’s 
population. However, it is home to 34 of the world’s 49 least developed countries, 
and home to 64 percent of the world’s HIV positive population.7 It continues to lose 
to Western States its own home talent of high and medium skilled professionals even 
though it is unable to attract foreign professionals of similar calibre. The United 
Kingdom (UK) Public Service Union UNISON writes that ‘health care workers make 
up an increasing proportion of migrant workers in the UK, the majority of whom are 
from Sub-Saharan Africa.’8
Current patterns of skilled immigration to the UK are often ascribed to the 
emergence of global labour markets and the continuation of specific migration linkages 
that reflect not only the UK’s historical position on international migration systems, 
but also its new distinctive position and functions in the global economy.9 The sum 
of the push and pull factors10 in the current skilled labour migration dynamic can only 
weaken Sub-Saharan Africa’s ability to pursue its development goals more effectively. 
7 Sub-Saharan Africa: UNFPA Worldwide, www.unfpa.org/africa/ (last accessed 28 January 2008). 
See also Centre for HIV Information website, University of California, available at: http://hivinsite.
ucsf.edu/global?page=cr09–00–00 (last accessed 27 January 2008).
8 UNISON, International Labour Migration – A UNISON Discussion Paper, 2002, available at: 
www.unison.org.uk/file/a2444.pdf.pdf (last accessed 27 January 2008). See also Bhorat, Haroon, 
Meyer, Jean-Batiste and Mlatsheni, Cecil, ‘Skilled Labour Migration from Developing Countries: 
Study on South and Southern Africa’ 2002, available at: www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/
migrant/download/imp/imp52e.pdf (last accessed 27 January 2008); and Davis, Catherine R. and 
Nichols, Barbara L., ‘Foreign-Educated Nurses and the Changing U.S. Nursing Workforce’, Nursing 
Administration Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2002, pp. 43–51, at p. 43.
9 See also Findlay, Allan, ‘From Brain Exchange to Brain Gain: Policy Implications for the UK of 
Recent Trends in Skilled Migration from Developing Countries’, 2001, available at: www.ilo.org/
public/english/protection/migrant/download/imp/imp43.pdf (last accessed 27 January 2008).
10 Examining the dynamics that underpin skilled labour migration, see Bhorat, Meyer and Mlatsheni, 
loc.cit. (note 8).
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Currently, the region does not appear capable of either attracting or retaining foreign 
skilled professionals at the same levels that it is losing its own professionals to the 
Western world.
The United Nations Population Fund’s (UNFPA) assessment of Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s potential to meet its development goals is bleak. UNFPA has characterised 
the challenges facing Sub-Saharan Africa as ‘the most daunting facing any region 
in the world. These objectives include reaching the eight Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) for 2015 and the closely related goals for 2015 set at the ICPD in 1994 
and the ICPD+5 follow up in 1999’.11 UNFPA lists the devastating AIDS pandemic, 
massive human displacements caused in part by frequent occurrence of natural 
disasters, violent conflicts and debilitating political strife as the main impediments in 
the effort to achieving the goals of countering poverty, empowering women, reducing 
child mortality and improving maternal health in the region.12
These observations inspire little confidence that Sub-Saharan Africa will have 
achieved its economic and human development goals by 2015. According to the 
UNFPA, this region will continue to require the highest per capita levels of technical 
and financial support of any region, if it is to make significant progress towards 
achieving the MDGs by 2015. This situation raises the question of the justiciability 
of the multilateral WTO trading system whose policies and operational dynamic 
disregard Sub-Saharan African States’ unique circumstances by subjecting them 
equally to the rigors of the trade liberalisation project.
The result is that Sub-Saharan Africa’s economies have to compete on an even 
keel with those of developed States. Their numerical strength – one quarter of the 
total membership of the WTO – is neutralised by the WTO’s modus operandi.13 
This appears to be a contradiction of sorts, because research suggests that developed 
economies continually strategise to ensure that developing economies just barely 
cope, but cannot compete with them.14
2.2. WTO THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK COMPATIBILITY WITH 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Howse’s15 lucid examination of the foundations and underpinnings of the modern 
international trading system shows that the WTO is premised on the theory of classic 
11 Sub-Saharan Africa: UNFPA Worldwide, loc.cit. (note 7).
12 Idem.
13 Numbering 149 States as of 11 December 2005. See generally WTO, ‘Understanding the WTO – 
members’, www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last accessed 27 January 
2008).
14 Chigara, Ben, ‘Trade Liberalization: Saviour or Scourge of SADC Economies?’, University of Miami 
International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 10, Special Issue, 2001–2002, pp. 7–21, at p. 21.
15 See Howse, Robert, ‘From Politics to Technocracy – and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral 
Trading Regime’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2002, pp. 94–117, at p. 94. 
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insights of absolute and comparative advantage developed by Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo.16 Under this paradigm the primary function of the WTO is to facilitate inter-
State trade in order to maximise gross international wealth.
But comparative advantage theory’s biggest weakness is that it focuses only on 
wealth creation without providing for the corresponding issue of the distribution of 
the consequent wealth. Lubker’s17 survey of people’s perceptions of inequality in 30 
countries shows that the majority of people (opinio communitatis) prefer to rethink 
the current drivers of global governance as a means of arresting the growth and extent 
of economic inequality both within and between States and economic regions of the 
world – what the ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation18 
has called an unfair and uninclusive globalisation that alienates the majority from 
current opportunities and benefits of the international trading system.
This is because the principle of absolute and comparative advantage on which 
the modern international trading system is premised, neglects the question of the 
redistribution of the wealth that it might create. Rather its focus is squarely on 
the creative function and ability of the international trading system to maximise 
international wealth creation, supported of course by the judicial supervisory 
function of the WTO dispute settlement body.19 Instead, it concerns itself with the 
efficacy and interdependency of different States’ trade and other economic policies. 
By eliminating inefficient practices in the global trading system, it hopes to discipline 
States to impose external trade costs on other States by virtue of their own domestic 
policies. A paramount goal of the multilateral WTO system is the minimisation of 
protectionist summum malum.20 However, this makes the WTO pretentious in that it 
assumes without any justification whatsoever,21 that the benefits of trade liberalisation 
See also Jackson, John H., ‘Afterword: The Linkage Problem – Comments on Five Texts’, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2002, pp. 118–125, at p. 118.
16 Holding that a policy of liberalising on imports, developed by the classical political economists 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, maximises the wealth of the liberaliser, see also Howse, loc.cit. 
(note 15). But challenging the validity of this view when the structural changes in the composition 
of international trade are taken into account, see Milberg, loc.cit. (note 5).
17 Lubker, Malte, ‘Globalization and Perceptions of Social Inequality’, International Labour Review, 
Vol. 143, No. 1–2, 2004, pp. 91–128, at p. 91.
18 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, ‘A Fair Globalization: Creating 
Opportunities for All’, available at: www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/docs/report.pdf (last 
accessed 23 January 2008). 
19 See generally Iwasawa, Yuji, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement as Judicial Supervision’, Journal of 
International Economic Law, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2002, pp. 287–305, at p. 287. See also Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement Dispute Article 3, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments – Results of 
the Uruguay Round, 33 International Legal Materials 1125. 
20 Howse, loc.cit. (note 15); and see Jackson, loc.cit. (note 15), at p. 122 (observing additional goals added 
onto the WTO in the last decade or two, namely the alleviation of poverty and the management of 
the risk of global financial and economic crises).
21 Examining whether and to what extent trade liberalisation as a policy requires responsibility 
of those that benefit the most to compensate those that lose the most under a trade adjustment 
Trade Liberalisation and Sub-Saharan Africa’s Potential to Achieve the UN MDGs by 2015
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 26/1 (2008) 15
will perhaps through some as yet unknown, inherent and magical characteristic or, 
that by some wondrous external inspiration, result in an equitable and satisfactory 
distribution of its harvests between States, and leaving them all better off.22 This is 
illusory for several reasons.
Firstly, even if we assumed that the gross international wealth resulting from 
States’ adherence to WTO policies somehow satisfactorily divided itself between States 
according to their needs, we would still be short of discovering first, what the needs of each 
State were; secondly, how those needs were determined to ensure parity among States; 
and thirdly, how those needs would be ranked, classified, aggregated, and weighted 
proportionately to determine their share of the consequent gross international wealth 
to be shared out among member States parties. We would still be short of discovering 
by what authority anyone made all the determinations referred to above.
Secondly, even if we assumed that the matrix for the determination of each State’s 
share of the resultant international wealth also indicated a corresponding measure 
of each State’s actual effort to the wealth creation endeavour, the problem would still 
subsist about the actual value to be given to each of the essentials such as labour, 
ideas, capital, and so on. The classification of first, the weight and value of each 
State’s contribution to the international wealth creation effort, and secondly, each 
State’s corresponding entitlement vis-à-vis the resultant international wealth would 
be fraught with all sorts of statistical, practical and systematic problems. It would 
prompt labour rich States to accuse capital rich States of Apartheid.
The determination of the corresponding proportion of each State’s contribution 
to the available gross international wealth would be problematic. For example, the 
cost of industrial labour has caused all sorts of social and economic problems in both 
hemispheres since the launch of the policy of trade liberalisation, as investors chase 
up cheap labour and low taxes in order to maximise their own profit margins.
Gunter and Van der Hoeven write that investors base their decisions on the 
location of production on ‘the most competitive combination of labour, technology, 
structural advantages and business environment which includes, inter alia, low taxes 
on profit and political stability’.23 This could explain the race in the 1990s among high 
and middle-income States towards the lowest possible denominator regarding the 
question of the value of labour in wages. Empirical research shows a marked transfer 
during this period of manufacturing production from the industrialised countries 
to the developing countries.24 How does one determine under these circumstances 
what the needs of each State should be, or indeed what the proportionate value of each 
assistance programme, see also Kapstein, Ethan, ‘Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Trade 
Adjustment Assistance’, International Labour Review, Vol. 137, No. 4, 1998, pp. 501–516, at p. 501.
22 The third of Dunkley’s three myths about the free trade project. Dunkley, G., Free Trade: Myth, 
Reality and Alternatives, Zed Publishers, London, 2004, p. 5. 
23 Gunter and Van der Hoeven, loc.cit. (note 5), at p. 17.
24 Idem.
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State’s contribution to the gross global wealth may be at any point in the international 
economic cycle?
One way to resolve this difficulty would be for the WTO to establish an agency25 
that approved the social benefit of market products worldwide. Such an agency would 
have the power to impose a prohibition in trade against all products that did not have 
the ‘workers earned a decent wage’ seal of approval. This requirement would refocus the 
emphasis from the necessary26 search for an elusive distributive system for sharing out 
the gross international wealth that resulted from States’ adherence to WTO policies, 
to an emphasis on decent treatment of all workers of the world through decent pricing 
of their labour. This would reinforce also current and ongoing ILO efforts to ensure 
everywhere that decent work was rewarded with decent remuneration.27 Nonetheless, 
this problem reveals the pretentious nature of the WTO’s selling point, that is, that all 
States that embrace its regime, will be better off in spite of the apparent absence of a 
distributive mechanism to allocate the consequent international wealth.
Moreover, there is neither practical nor empirical evidence in support of the 
proposition that every State that participates in the multilateral trading system, 
will end up better off. The reality is that States are faring very differently, with the 
economically strong States getting stronger and the weak ones getting weaker. States’ 
national wealth is increasingly confined within the hands of a very small number 
of individuals – what one might perhaps call ‘the slavery of trade liberalisation’.28 
Evidence of this is commonplace.
The UNDP annual Human Development Report (2005)29 shows that:
– The fight against poverty and the realisation of the MDGs have made only limited 
progress. Current trends indicate that, unless intervention is made to arrest the 
situation, 827 million people will be living in extreme poverty by 2015.
– Fifty countries have actually lost ground with regards to at least one goal – this 
relates especially to southern Africa, which has been decimated by the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. Twelve of the 18 countries whose HDI is lower than it was in 1990, are 
African.
25 The ILO has a long history and experience of doing this. See generally Richthoven, Wolfgang, 
Labour Inspection: A Guide to the Profession, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2002. 
26 Gunter and Van der Hoeven, loc.cit. (note 5), at p. 20.
27 International Labour Organisation, ‘Decent Work and the Informal Economy’, Report VI, 90th 
Session, 20 June 2002.
28 See Khan-Freund, Otto, ‘Notes of Cases – Servants and Independent Contractors’, Modern Law 
Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1951, pp. 485–511, at pp. 485–504.
29 Martens, Jens, Global Policy Forum, Dialogue on Globalization Briefing Papers, ‘A Compendium of 
Inequality: The Human Development Report 2005 – FES Briefing Paper October 2005’, available at: 
www.globalpolicy.org/eu/en/publ/fespaper4hdr2005.pdf (last accessed 27 January 2008). See also 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Annual Report 2005, ‘A Time for Bold Ambition: 
Together We Can Cut Poverty in Half ’, available at: www.undp.org/annualreports/2005/english/
IAR05-English.pdf (last accessed 27 January 2008).
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– Fifty individuals in the world have a combined income greater than that of the 
poorest 416 million.
– There are two and a half million persons living on less than two dollars a day.
– Forty percent of the world’s population receive only five percent of global income.
– The richest ten percent of the world’s population receive 54 percent of the global 
income.
However, in spite of this, the WTO still promises overall economic progress for all 
member States parties of the organisation that adhere to its regime.30 This underlines 
the organisation’s preoccupation with, and assimilation of classical insights about the 
benefits of trade liberalisation. It is not surprising that the first dozen years’ practice 
of the WTO system has resulted in mixed and alarmingly divergent outcomes for 
different member States parties, for different economic regions, and for different 
categories of States contrary to the promise of positive outcomes for all.
Among other concerns, this begs the question of whether the classical theory of 
comparative advantage is appropriate to international trade law’s post-war goal of 
enabling States to manage their domestic economies in a manner that is ‘consistent 
with political and social stability and justice, without the risk of setting off a 
protectionist race to the bottom’.31 This is the challenge that faces the innovators of 
the WTO multilateral trading system.
This article focuses on the possible impact on Sub-Saharan Africa of the current 
WTO sponsored policy of trade liberalisation in relation to the question of whether, 
and to what extent the UN will have achieved the MDGs by the target date of 2015 in 
that region. It shows that the current WTO sponsored trade liberalisation project might 
have nurtured, extended and strengthened the economic inequalities between and 
within economic regions of the world, and also between and within States themselves.
Murphy writes that Americans are getting poorer except for the top 20 percent of 
the population, as more and more income shifts to the very top, and the American 
Dream becomes less and less attainable for more than 80 percent of the population.
The differences between the top fifth – the richest – and the bottom fifth – the poorest – 
is almost equal to what it was during the Great Depression, with no New Deal in sight. 
(…) This discrepancy was made painfully apparent during the Hurricane Katrina disaster 
when the poorest of New Orleans’ inhabitants – the bottom fifth, suffered the lack of nearly 
all life-sustaining resources.32
The UNDP reports that differences are acutely extreme within Namibia, Zimbabwe, 
South Africa, Chile, and Brazil.
30 Dunkley, op.cit. (note 22).
31 Ibidem, at p. 95.
32 Murphy, Pat, ‘Peak American – Is Our Time Up?’, available at: www.countercurrents.org/pro-
murphy260106.htm (last accessed 27 January 2008).
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3. EMERGENT WTO OUTCOMES
3.1. GINI-COEFFICIENT INDICATORS
Measurement of the inequality in the income distribution – known as the Gini-
coefficient – not only confirms economic inequality within and between States, but 
signals a threat to international peace and security from poverty.33 Available data 
shows that 80 percent of the world’s population is spread across countries where the 
Gini-coefficients are unacceptable.
The Gini-coefficient is a number between zero and one that measures the degree 
of inequality in the distribution of income in a given society. The coefficient would 
register zero (0.0 = minimum inequality) for a society in which each member received 
exactly the same income and it would register a coefficient of one (1.0 = maximum 
inequality) if one member got all the income and the rest got nothing.34
A Gini-coefficient of 0.3 or less is generally accepted as normal. However, anything 
higher is considered unstable. A value of 0.6 or higher is predictive of social unrest. The 
UNDP Annual Report (2005) observes that in 2003 45 million Americans lacked basic 
health insurance. This figure was made up of 34 percent Hispanic Americans, 21 percent 
Afro-Americans, and only 13 percent white Americans. This social inequality in the 
affordability of health service in the USA resulted in a disproportionate experience of 
infant mortality rates which were twice as much among Afro-Americans as for white 
Americans.
One consequence of such economic inequalities, wherever they occur, is the 
facilitation of the development of a social dynamic that ensures, sustains, and even 
fosters the cycle of poverty instead of challenging, limiting and uprooting it. Even 
worse, these economic inequalities can breed a human desperation and ruthlessness 
that creates opportunities for such practices as illegal inter-State and inter-regional 
economic immigration. This is often accompanied with a breakdown of family ties for 
those involved and the facilitation of such anti-human rights practices, such as human 
trafficking and economic enslavement of illegal economic migrants in prostitution 
and other illegal and/or hazardous occupations with no regard to national health and 
safety standards. The ILO writes that
[o]f the eighty to ninety-seven million migrant workers and their dependents now in 
countries other than their own, it is estimated that perhaps no less than fifteen percent are 
working on an irregular basis. (…) In addition to fostering irregularity, this climate has 
contributed to the opening up of a lucrative market for the smuggling and trafficking of 
33 The Secretary-General of the UN is on record for arguing that a world mired in poverty cannot 
be a world at peace. UNDP, ‘2015: Ten Years to Change the World’, available at: www.unpd.org/
annualreports/2005/english/IAR05-English-TenYears.pdf (last accessed 27 January 2008).
34 Gini-coefficients, available at: http://berclo.net/page01/01en-gini-coef.htm (last accessed 27 January 
2008).
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migrant workers. Women and children are especially victimized; many are trafficked into 
conditions of slave labour and/or forced prostitution. The human suffering, maltreatment 
and exploitation that ensue as a result require little explanation and have been the focus of 
much media, governmental and NGO attention.35
Such economic inequalities and anti-human rights practices justify the mobilisation 
of international action to ensure the delivery by States on human rights standards that 
they have long promised to recognise, promote and protect for all individuals on their 
territories. The UN MDGs seek to mobilise international action for that purpose.
3.2. THE UN MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND WTO 
OUTCOMES
The MDGs are not mere aspirations, but a compact between rich and poor States to 
achieve a balance in the new millennium between the pursuit of economic growth36 on 
the one hand, and human development on the other. The purpose is to better facilitate 
the fight against poverty and preventable and curable disease, provisions of education 
and decent work for many and not the few worldwide. This compact is set in eight 
measurable time bound goals agreed on 8 September 2000 by 189 States attending 
the Millennium Summit at the UN Headquarters in New York – the Millennium 
Declaration.37 The Declaration lists concrete goals, with outcomes that can be 
monitored and measured through the way to the target date of 2015. Therefore, the 
MDGs declare and herald a human development agenda for the new millennium.38
The UNDP39 has characterised the UNMDGs as:
– A new framework for development that demands results and increases 
accountability.
– A time bound, measurable development manifesto for ordinary individuals 
around the world.
– An agenda for elevating poverty to the top of the global agenda.
35 International Labour Migration – About MIGRANT, Migrations Concerns: Irregular Migration 
and Exploitation of Labour, available at: www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/about/
index.htm (last accessed 27 January 2008).
36 Research shows that the first, second, and third UN development decades, the 1960s, the 1970s, and 
the 1980s respectively were concerned with economic transformation and growth. Industrialisation 
was privileged above all else. See Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, ‘Millennium Development Goals: Why They 
Matter’, Global Governance, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2004, pp. 359–402, at p. 395.
37 United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res. 55/2, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2, 8 September 2000.
38 Fukuda-Parr, loc.cit. (note 36).
39 See UNDP website at: www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml (last accessed 27 January 2008). See also 
Chigara, loc.cit. (note 2).
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– A means for better managing globalisation40 on behalf of poor people.
An immediate accomplishment of the Millennium Declaration’s eight goals which 
range from halving extreme poverty, to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015 has 
been the refocus of developmental targets and goals of governments, aid agencies and 
civil society organisations everywhere. Nonetheless, research shows that if they are to 
achieve the UNMDGs by 2015, two groups of countries require a quick and radical 
change.
One is the group of 59 ‘top priority and high priority’ countries that are characterised 
by low human development and poor performance in relation to the MDGs.41 The 
other comprises countries that are making progress towards the realisation of the 
goals but with deep pockets of poor people being left behind. Sub-Saharan Africa 
alone has 25 top priority countries and 13 high priority countries. This makes Sub-
Saharan Africa the central object of poverty and hunger and underdevelopment 
among the regions of the world.
In a sense, the MDGs are the boldest declaration since the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948)42 that the pursuit of economic growth – with all the benefits it 
brings,43 should not be privileged above human development. In this sense, the MDGs 
evidence is a desperate effort by the UN to minimise its failure44 in the past to promote 
the rights that are specifically being championed under the MDG programme.45
In spite of an inspiring and committed legislative campaign to ensure the security 
and welfare of individuals through the development of international human rights 
covenants and treaties, for nearly 60 years, success stories are few and far between 
and overcrowded with alarming failures. Poverty still reins unrestricted in countries 
40 Globalisation is a bi-product of irreversible creative synergies that have facilitated freer trade, 
technological advancement, deeper cross-border production structures and systems, increased 
capital and human mobility, and greater information flows and communication. See Gunter, 
Bernhard G. et al., ‘Special Issue: More Equitable Globalization’, International Labour Review, Vol. 
143, No. 1–2, 2004, pp. 7–43. See also Ghose, Ajit K., Jobs and Incomes in a Globalising World, 
International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 2003. 
41 See generally UNDP, Annual Report 2003, ‘A World of Development Experience’, June 2003), 
available at: www.undp.org/annualreports/2003/english/IAR03completeE.pdf (last accessed 27 
January 2008).
42 See Fukuda-Parr, loc.cit. (note 36) (discussing the significance of the UN MDGs).
43 Economic growth is critical to human welfare. Nonetheless, it depends on human beings for its 
creation. Therefore, in a sequential sense, it must serve humans for its own good. Ultimately, it 
depends on humans.
44 In particular, the issue of slavery has not been acknowledged to the same extent that Nazism has 
been in spite of the closeness of the ideologies. Colonialism was legal under international law and 
no redress has ever been paid by colonial masters for the dehumanising practice. See Chigara, 
Ben, ‘Short-Circuiting International Law’, Oregon Review of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2006, 
pp. 191–229, at p. 191.
45 Analysing both the logic and magnificence of the vision that began the human rights legislative 
process see Legomsky, Stephen H., ‘The United Nations and the Protection of Human Rights’, 
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2001, pp. 7–17, at p. 7.
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that make up 80 percent of the world population; preventable and curable diseases 
alarmingly continue to maim and kill women and children especially in the developing 
world.46
Thus, the MDGs could be defined as an attempt to re-launch the human rights 
commitments that States had previously made but failed to realise for people 
everywhere. The MDGs established standards for the progressive realisation of 
previously neglected economic and social rights by integrating political factors such 
as civil rights and democratic representation with social factors such as education and 
health, and economic factors such as growth and employment.
Contrary to the WTO value system, but just like the ILO, the MDGs regard people 
as the key agents of change and not as mere beneficiaries of progress.47 UNDP48 has 
summarised the potential benefits of achieving the MDGs as follows:
– Removing 500 million people from extreme poverty
– Removing 300 million people from extreme hunger
– Ensuring safe drinking water for 350 million more people
– Ensuring that 30 million more children will live beyond their fifth birthdays
– Ensuring that two million more women will survive childbirth
Instead, the unintended, worst possible effects of the current WTO sponsored trade 
liberalisation project stand in the way of the achievement of the MDGs by the target 
date of 2015, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. While it is correct to say that there 
cannot be progress towards achievement of the MDGs by the target date of 2015 in 
the absence of economic wealth; it is even more correct to say: (i) that the conditions 
under which that wealth is created are themselves a test of whether and to what extent 
progress has occurred towards achievement of the MDGs; and (ii) that allocation 
and distribution within and between States of the social power that determines the 
distribution of the wealth resulting from States’ adherence to the WTO policy of trade 
liberalisation is even more important because:
– A major function of the MDGs is to undercut poverty, privation and avoidable 
human suffering. Therefore, economic practices that extend social inequalities 
to the extent of breeding such crimes as human trafficking, enslavement, forced 
prostitution, and so on, are themselves as bad as the wealth that they create – black 
wealth.
– Progress towards the achievement of the MDGs should be made and funded only 
by ‘clean’ international wealth because of the moral significance that has been 
attached to the programme. This implies that workers that produce that wealth 
46 See Martens, loc.cit. (note 29).
47 Fukuda-Parr, loc.cit. (note 36), at p. 396.
48 UNDP, loc.cit. (note 29), at p. 10.
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must be involved in decent work, and working under humane conditions that 
include payment of decent wages.
– Maximisation of gross international wealth is acceptable only if its procedures 
recognise workers as separate and not the same as or equal to other capital required 
in economic endeavour. It should be acceptable for application in the cause of the 
MDGs only if it recognises, respects and promotes the dignity inherent in its 
producers as human beings.
3.3. COMBINING ILO AND WTO DYNAMICS TO ENSURE HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT ORIENTED WEALTH MAXIMISATION
As a consequence of the foregoing discussion, this article recommends first, 
institutional and policy interventions that target the minimisation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the unintended worst possible effects of the current WTO sponsored trade 
liberalisation project. In particular, the article recommends ILO supervision of 
the WTO enterprise in Sub-Saharan Africa in order to balance economic growth 
against human development. This could include ILO training and provision of direct 
guidance and assistance to government departments and officials of Sub-Saharan 
African States on such matters as negotiation, reception and management of foreign 
direct and indirect investment schemes, and ensuring that foreign investors observe 
all the minimum industrial relations standards that have been endorsed by the ILO 
Conference and Governing Body. In this sense, ILO would become the broker and 
ensurer of equal dignity of labour between Sub-Saharan African workers and workers 
everywhere else in the world.
This recommendation should be acceptable, because it is consistent with the 
ILO’s originating purpose, which is to counter the economic and social injustices 
and inequalities that accompany social and economic change.49 Formally, the Treaty 
of Versailles (1919) provided in Article 387 for the creation of the International 
Labour Organisation for the purpose of attending terrible conditions of labour.50 
Considerations of humanity and fear of unfair competition galvanised the commitment 
to secure a universal social policy for the global world of work.
ILO is immensely experienced at developing, monitoring and enforcing social 
justice standards across the world.51 Moreover, the link between WTO and ILO 
enterprises is a matter of fact.52 ILO is the custodian of workers rights in the United 
49 Chigara, loc.cit. (note 2).
50 Idem.
51 Evaluating the standard-setting activity of the ILO and its procedures for monitoring their 
application, see also Wisskirchen, Alfred, ‘The Standard-Setting and Monitoring Activity of the 
ILO: Legal Questions and Practical Experience’, International Labour Review, Vol. 144, No. 3, 2005, 
pp. 253–289, at p. 253.
52 See Alvarez, José E., ‘The WTO as Linkage Machine’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
96, No. 1, 2002, pp. 146–148, at p. 146.
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Nations system.53 Juan Somavia, the ILO Director General, writes that the primary 
goal of ILO today is to promote opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and 
productive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity. Decent 
work is summed up as that which:
sums up the aspirations of people in their working lives. It involves opportunities for work 
that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection 
for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for 
people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their 
lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men. [For this reason it] 
(…) should be at the heart of global, national and local strategies for economic and social 
progress. It is central to efforts to reduce poverty, and a means for achieving equitable, 
inclusive and sustainable development. The ILO works to promote decent work through its 
work on employment, social protection, standards and fundamental principles and rights 
at work and social dialogue.54
This mission realises that the world is burdened with tired, overworked and 
unemployed people. It targets workers everywhere, including the unregulated wage 
earners, the self-employed, domestic workers and ‘unrecognised workers’.55
During the eight-year negotiations to establish WTO (1986–1994), controversy 
erupted in the 1980s over proposals to include a social clause in agreements negotiated 
during the Uruguay Round.56 Although the Final Act of the Uruguay Round signed 
at Marrakech, Morocco in April 1994 avoided explicit reference to a social clause, 
the ILO immediately established in June 1994 ‘The Working Party on the Social 
Dimensions of the Liberalization of International Trade’.57 These two developments 
served as a marker for the contentious issues that would attend the WTO sponsored 
trade liberalisation project. They served to underline an inevitable connection between 
trade liberalisation matters, and social justice issues.58
53 See Sen, Amartya, ‘Work and Rights’, International Labour Review, Vol. 139, No. 2, 2000, 
pp. 119–128. 
54 Somavia, Juan, Director General, ILO, ‘Decent Work – The Heart of Social Progress’, available at: 
www.ilo.org/public/english/decent.htm (last accessed 27 January 2008). See also Paratian, Rafendra 
and Dasgupta, Sukti (eds), ILO Socio-Economic Security Programme: Confronting Economic Security 
in Africa, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2004.
55 Sen, loc.cit. (note 53), at pp. 119–128.
56 See Leary, Virginia A., ‘The WTO and the Social Clause: Post-Singapore’, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1997, pp. 118–122, at p. 118. See also Torres, Raymond, Towards 
a socially sustainable world economy: An analysis of the social pillars of globalisation, International 
Labour Office, Geneva, 2001, p. 3. 
57 See International Labour Organization, ‘Governing Body – Minutes, 260th Session, June 1994.
58 On the links between the WTO enterprise and non trade issues, including corruption and bribery, 
health care, environmental concerns, culture, and so on, see Alvarez et al., loc.cit. (note 1).
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3.4. A SOCIAL JUSTICE TEMPERED INTERNATIONAL TRADING 
REGIME
For several reasons, the struggle for social justice in international trade is a worthwhile 
enterprise. Firstly, it is one way by which the prevalence of the worst unintended 
effects59 of the current WTO sponsored international trade liberalisation project 
could be monitored, controlled and reduced to make trade liberalisation both efficient 
and balanced in order to avoid replacing one evil with another.60 Secondly, research 
is unclear about whether the current WTO sponsored trade liberalisation project is 
undermining previous achievements of ILO.61 Nonetheless, there is strong empirical 
evidence to support the view that:
– Conditions of work and employment appear to improve with economic growth 
and trade liberalisation.62
– The pursuit of decent work for all more often than not leads to both human 
development and economic growth.63
– Countries that are characterised by low labour standard do not necessarily have an 
inferior export nor do they attract more FDI.64
Thirdly, the UN has staked the conscience of the world on the achievement of the 
MDGs by the target date of 2015. For this reason, it is necessary to explore the 
possibility of reconciling the enterprises of the UN, ILO and WTO in relation to the 
MDGs.
This article argues for a counterbalancing of the enterprises of ILO and WTO 
enterprises in order to mobilise a significantly international effort towards achievement 
of the UN MDGs and to facilitate the security of the welfare of individuals everywhere. 
It insists that ILO should have a significant role to play in the effort to ensure the 
59 An opposite outcome to that targeted by the sponsoring ‘expected utility’ principle. See Kovandzic, 
Tomislav V. et al., ‘Unintended Consequences of Politically Popular Sentencing Policy: The 
Homicide Promoting Effects of “Three Strikes” in U.S. Cities (1980–1999)’, Criminology and Public 
Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2001–2002, pp. 399–424, at p. 399.
60 Quoting Emmanuel, Arghiri, Appropriate or Underdeveloped Technology, John Wiley and Sons, 
London, 1982; Bardhan writes that ‘If capitalism is hell here exists a still more frightful hell: that 
of less developed capitalism’; Bardhan, Pranab, Social justice in the Global Economy, International 
Labour Organisation, Geneva, 2000, p. 19. 
61 For example, Ghose, Ajit K., ‘Trade Liberalization, Employment and Global Inequality’, 
International Labour Review, Vol. 139, No. 3, 2000, pp. 281–305, at p. 281; Torres, op.cit. (note 56), 
at pp. 51–66; and Lübker, Malte, ‘Globalization and Perceptions of Social Inequality’, International 
Labour Review, Vol. 143, No. 1–2, 2004, pp. 91–128, at p. 91.
62 Flanagan, Robert J. and Gould IV, William B. (eds), International Labour Standards: Globalisation, 
Trade and Public Policy, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2003, p. 4.
63 Idem.
64 Idem.
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limitation of the unintended worst effects of the current WTO sponsored trade 
liberalisation project because:
1) It is the oldest and most experienced agency of the UN65 with both logistical 
and operational capacity to tackle and manage the unintended worst forms of 
social injustice that may unwittingly accompany the WTO trade liberalisation 
dynamic.
2) It is specifically mandated to pursue social justice for people everywhere and 
inter-State trade is a matter of concern for ordinary individuals in every country 
on earth.66 There is little reason to celebrate the achievements of WTO policies 
and practice in Sub-Saharan Africa.67 In spite of the WTO promise of improved 
economic performance for all States, Sub-Saharan African States remain 
economically dependent on the gratuitous tolerance of more powerful economic 
trading blocs such as the EC and nation States such as the USA.68
3) The linkage between globalisation and human development is incontestable, 
because ultimately it is trade or the absence of it that drives ordinary peoples’ 
livelihoods everywhere. Globalisation is about market competition and efficiency. 
Because more than 50 nations have become economically poorer, and therefore, 
worse-off since the WTO inspired trade liberalisation policy was launched – nearly 
all of them African – UNDP writes that the long term initiatives to halve hunger 
and poverty contained in the UN MDGs will fail, unless the global trading system 
is overhauled fundamentally.69 This article argues for that overhaul to be inspired 
and guided by the ILO’s pursuit of social justice for people everywhere.
65 ILO was founded in 1919 and is the only surviving major creation of the Treaty of Versailles, which 
brought the League of Nations into being. It became the first specialised agency of the UN in 1946. 
See ILO – About the ILO, available at: www.ilo.org/public/english/about/index.htm (last accessed 
27 January 2008).
66 See ILO, Constitution, Preamble, 1919, available at: www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm 
(last accessed 27 January 2008) (hereinafter ILO Constitution).
67 See Chigara, loc.cit. (note 14), at pp. 7–21. See also African Growth and Opportunity Acceleration Act 
of 2004, H.R. 4103, 108th Cong., 2004 (enacted) (hereinafter AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004). See 
generally AOGA Background, available at: www.agoa.gov/agoa_legislation/agoa_legislation.html 
(last accessed 27 January 2008) (explaining that the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
was signed by President Bush on 18 May 2000 into law as Title 1 of The Trade and Development Act 
of 2000, and that the Act offers is intended to encourage African countries to continue their efforts 
to open their economies and to build free markets). See also The White House, ‘President Bush 
Signs African Growth and Opportunity Act: Remarks by the President at Signing of the AGOA 
Acceleration Act of 2004’, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040713–3.
html (last accessed 27 January 2008) (hereinafter Remarks by the President at 2004 AOGA 
Signing).
68 See also AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004, supra note 67. See generally AGOA Background, supra 
note 67; and see also Remarks by the President at 2004 AOGA Signing, supra note 67.
69 Chigara, loc.cit. (note 2).
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First, this article tests the claims of the multilateral WTO trading system to make 
all member State parties better-off70 against the experience of Sub-Saharan African 
States. The findings point to sharp inconsistencies between WTO politics and promises 
on the one hand, and the experience of Sub-Saharan African States on the other. This 
disparity strengthens the tension between the increasingly people oriented welfare 
model of the UN and the capitalist oriented market model of the multilateral WTO 
trading system.
Secondly, the article examines claims of linkages between trade liberalisation 
and social justice.71 It makes the case for counterbalancing the enterprises of the 
multilateral WTO trading system and the ILO. Both organisations have separate 
distinct origins from the UN, although the latter is the dominant vision caster of the 
international organisation. Although it predates the UN, ILO entered on 14 December 
194672 as a specialised agency agreement with the UN, making it part of the UN. 
However, WTO has no such agreement with the UN. It remains autonomous.
While WTO’s main concern is the maximisation of gross international wealth, 
ILO is mainly concerned with securing international peace and security through the 
guarantee of social justice for individuals everywhere. Both ILO and WTO each have 
a critical potential to impact the achievement or failure of the UNMDGs by the target 
date of 2015.
3.5. A TENSION BETWEEN UN AND WTO ENTERPRISES?73
The question of distribution of the gross international wealth that is created by States’ 
adherence to WTO policies is critical to any attempt to evaluate the UN’s potential 
to achieve its MDGs in Sub-Saharan Africa by the target date of 2015. One reason for 
this appears to be that the WTO economic and trade paradigm deliberately side steps 
issues of ownership, disbursement and enjoyment of the gross international wealth 
that may result from States’ application and adherence to its regime. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that WTO has not factored into its blueprint measures to mitigate 
against the worst possible unintended effects of its regime on States. This omission 
now appears to threaten the realisation of the UN MDGs in Sub-Saharan Africa by 
70 Dunkley, op.cit. (note 22).
71 There is a burgeoning literature on the doctrine of linkages. This article does not explore that 
literature; see Alvarez et al., loc.cit. (note 1) (discussing the doctrine of linkage issue).
72 See Agreements between Specialized Agencies and the United Nations – ILO: Agreement came 
into force: 14 December 1946, available at: www.unsystemceb.org/reference/system/agreements 
(last accessed 27 January 2008). See also GA Res. 50(I), 14 December 1946, available at: www.
unsystemceb.org/reference/system/agreements/ilo_unesco_fao_icao_a_50_1946 (last accessed 27 
January 2008).
73 Dommen, Caroline, ‘Raising Human Rights Concerns in the WTO: Actors, Processes and Possible 
Strategies’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2002, pp. 1–50, at p. 1. 
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the target date of 2015.74 This is evidenced by Sub-Saharan African member States 
parties’ increased resort to bilateral and regional trade agreements75 as alternatives to 
the multilateral system.
Whereas WTO looks to the creation of vibrant markets – in essence the stimulation 
and sustenance of a vibrant world economy that provides for efficiency and improved 
consumer-welfare everywhere, the UN looks to the improved political, economic, 
social, individual and group security of individuals everywhere. While these 
objectives may not be entirely mutually exclusive, the extreme emphasis by the WTO 
on the former compels a readjustment of priorities especially for the UN which caters 
for more than one issue. While the WTO appears to be a single issue organization, 
the UN deals with a diverse range of issues. They include environmental protection, 
economic security, political security, armed security, individual security, national 
security, minorities’ security, and so on.
Consequently, by creating social tension through economic servitude and 
alienation WTO’s extreme economic benefit radicalism usurps the UN’s mission 
of ensuring international peace and security through respect of human rights of 
individuals, because the WTO modus operandi appears to undermine the economic 
welfare of the majority for the benefit of the few individuals in a few countries. By 
focusing only on demonstrable maximisation of gross international wealth, the WTO 
architects might have ignored the all-important question of whether economic growth 
should be achieved at any cost, including human rights and human development. This 
question has in the last half century exercised the debate about whether there is a need 
to strike a balance between the pursuit of economic growth and the pursuit of human 
development, and if so what that balance might be?
Obsession with economic growth has shown over the years that, while economic 
expansion is critical to human development, it must remain a means that does not 
ever take over as the policy driver. This obsession has shown also that economic 
development that is not adequately tempered with concerns about human welfare 
can be ‘ruthless, by benefiting some at the expense of others; voiceless, by excluding 
the voice of people; jobless, by creating wealth but not jobs; futureless, by exhausting 
the next generation’s resources; and rootless, by destroying cultural traditions and 
identities.’76
Consequently, the voices that seek to counter what appears to be an obsession to 
equate global development with growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and gross 
74 International peace and security is the UN’s foremost concern. Several factors contribute to the 
achievement of this objective. The MDGs are a subset of this overall objective.
75 Discussing the practice of West African States, see Kufuor, Kofi Oteng, The Institutional 
Transformation of the Economic of West African States, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2006. 
Discussing Africa’s economic and human development opportunities in the 21st century, see also 
Konadu-Agyemang, Kwadwo and Panford, Kwamina (eds), Africa’s development in the Twenty-first 
Century: Pertinent Socio-economic and Development Issues, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006. 
76 Fukuda-Parr, loc.cit. (note 36), at p. 396.
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international wealth are growing in number and not diminishing.77 They include the 
ILO that has long stood for the importance of differentiating in industry between 
human resources and capital resources, arguing for the recognition, protection and 
promotion of the dignity inherent in workers everywhere as human beings.
Research shows that in the 1980s basic human need theorists argued for 
development that focused on human needs.78 In the 1990s, self-actualisation economic 
theorists such as Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq argued for human development 
that was driven by the need to create social and economic environments in which 
people everywhere could lead full and creative lives.79 The MDGs appear to be an 
embodiment and declaration of the supremacy in UN thinking of the primacy of 
human development over any other form of development.
However, WTO is radically international wealth maximisation centric. Its approach 
appears to be diametrically opposed to the MDGs. The World Bank’s Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG) 2006 Report on the impact of global trade programs between 
1987 and 200480 concludes that, while the strategy may have succeeded in opening up 
target countries’ markets, it has not been as effective in boosting exports and growth 
and alleviating poverty. The Report examines the efficacy of the Bank’s strategy of 
applying USD 38 billion (8.1 percent of the Bank’s total commitments) to assist 117 
developing countries become better integrated into the international economy.81
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) indicators for Sub-
Saharan Africa chime the loudest about the WTO’s apparent legitimacy deficit82 
because of the apparent rift between its manifesto promise and the experience of 
different regions, States and categories of States. In its 2003 Report83 UNDP warns 
77 See especially ILO, A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All, Report of the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, ILO, Geneva, 2004; and Rajagopal, 
Balakrishnan, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World 
Resistance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
78 Idem.
79 Idem.
80 World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, ‘Assessing World Nak Support for Trade 1987–2004: 
An IEG Evaluation’, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World 
Bank 2006), available at: www.worldbank.org/ieg/trade/docs/trade_evaluation.pdf (last accessed 
27 January 2008).
81 Ibidem, at p. xiii.
82 This is compounded by WTO’s increasing failure to discharge its obligations under the Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Article 
3(2), 15 April 1994, 33 International Legal Materials 1125, 1994, which provides that ‘the WTO 
shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade 
relations in matters dealt with under the agreements…’ and it ‘may also provide a forum for further 
negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations.’ Discussing the 
increasing disagreement in the Ministerial Conference of the WTO about the real issues that must 
be tackled, see Charnovitz, Steve, ‘Triangulating the World Trade Organization’, American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2002, pp. 28–55, at p. 28.
83 UNDP, Human Development Programme Report 2003 – Millennium Development Goals: A Compact 
Among Nations to end Human Poverty, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 16, available at: 
Trade Liberalisation and Sub-Saharan Africa’s Potential to Achieve the UN MDGs by 2015
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 26/1 (2008) 29
of a crisis in the decline in the Human Development Index84 (HDI) of 21 countries. 
This begs the question of whether the practice of the WTO system is: (i) consistent 
with its promise of making all member States parties better off; and (ii) compatible 
with the temporal economic and developmental aspirations of the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals85 (UNMDGs) and of African States in particular as 
outlined in part in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2002);86 the Banjul 
Charter;87 the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Treaty,88 the 
Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) Treaty,89 the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD) Treaty; the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (CCOMESA) Treaty;90 and the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS).91
www.gateway.hr/files/d0000/gw_40gjp1.pdf (last accessed 27 January 2008).
84 The HDI is a summary measure of three dimensions of human development, namely, life expectancy, 
standard of education, and standard of living; see ibidem, at p. 34.
85 See The UN Millennium Development Goals, available at: www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last 
accessed 27 January 2008). See also United Nations Millennium Declaration, supra note 37, at 
pp. 11–30.
86 See African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000, available at: www.au2002.
gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm (last accessed 27 January 2008).
87 See Organization of African Unity (OAU), African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 
adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 International Legal Materials 58, 1982 
(entered into force 21 October 1986).
88 Southern African Development Community (SADC), Profile: Southern African Development 
Community, available at: www.africa-union.org/Recs/SADCProfile.pdf (last accessed 18 February 
2008). See also Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 17 August 1992, 13 
International Legal Materials 120, 1993.
89 Economic Community of West African States – Revised Treaty, 28 May 1975, 35 International 
Legal Materials 663, 1996. See also About AU – Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), 
available at: www.africa-union.org/About_AU/Abrecs.htm (last accessed 27 January 2008); and 
West Africa (ECOWAS) Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis - Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal, available 
at: www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/ECOWAS/Background.html (last accessed 27 January 2008).
90 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 8 December 1994, 33 International 
Legal Materials 1072, 1994. See also About AU – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), available at: www.africa-union.org/About_AU/Abrecs.htm (last accessed 27 January 
2008).
91 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 19 October 1983, 23 International 
Legal Materials 945, 1984. See also ‘About AU – Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS)’, available at: www.africa-union.org/About_AU/Abrecs.htm (last accessed 27 January 
2008).
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3.6. SWEATING THE ASSETS UNDER THE MULTILATERAL WTO 
REGIME, BUT IN WHOSE FAVOUR AND TO WHAT EFFECT?
The IMF claims that international trade and financial openness increased for both 
developed and developing countries in the early 1990s.92 This was a time when IMF 
and World Bank economic structural adjustment programmes93 were being effected 
in some Sub-Saharan African countries.94 Trade and financial openness rose sharply 
from 1995 when the WTO agreement came into force and continues to strengthen, 
reflecting acceleration in globalisation.
Figure 3.7.1 below shows Trade and Financial Openness (Percent of GDP). 
Correspondingly, the African region has witnessed a net decline in economic 
performance, which increasing calls for more responsible trade liberalisation, which 
is meant to institutionalise alongside the WTO economic system, mechanisms ‘for 
poverty and distributional outcomes, and to cushioning shocks associated with 
trade policies.’95 The ILO based World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalization Report (2004) observes that the marginalisation of some economies 
is due to deficiencies in the governance of trade liberalisation and not to trade 
liberalisation itself. But if there is nothing wrong with the medicine, why are some of 
its patients, the ones that need it the most, succumbing to its worst side effects?
Africa’s marginalisation from the success of the international economic system 
is attributable in part to biased trade liberalisation where some States are able to give 
with one hand and take back with bucket loads. For instance, industrialised countries’ 
subsidy regimes continue to undermine Africa’s agrarian economies. The UN’s Africa 
Renewal writes:
In 2001, cotton subsidies cost Mali, a West African nation highly dependent on the crop, 
$43 million in potential revenue. This is more than Mali received in aid that year. (…) 
Donor countries responded to NEPAD by pledging, at the 2002 International Conference 
on Financing for Development, in Mexico, to increase the quality and quantity of aid to 
92 International Monetary Fund, ‘Trade and Financial Openness’, available at: www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/weo/2006/01/chp3pdf/fig3_4.pdf (last accessed 27 January 2008).
93 Structural Adjustment Programmes involve conditional loans given to States by lending 
institutions. The ‘conditions’ often include privatisation of State enterprises and lifting import and 
export barriers that normally protect domestic labour markets from dumping cheap imports and 
subsidies. See Collier, Paul, ‘The Marginalization of Africa’, International Labour Review, Vol. 134, 
No. 4–5, 1995, pp. 541–557, at p. 541.
94 Notably Ghana, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe, but other countries 
in this group did not have to make ESAPs, notably Botswana. See UNCTAD-UNDP Global 
Programme, ‘Membership of UNCTAD and TDB’, available at: www.unctad-undp.org/ (follow 
‘UNCTAD’ hyperlink; then follow ‘About UNCTAD’ hyperlink; then follow ‘UNCTAD’s 
Membership’ hyperlink) (last accessed 27 January 2008).
95 World Bank – Trade Evaluation Independent Evaluation Group, ‘Assessing World Bank Support for 
Trade 1987–2004: An IEG Evaluation – Overview’, available at: www.worldbank.org/ieg/trade/ (last 
accessed 27 January 2008).
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Africa. In 2002, the $22.2 billion Africa received in aid was lower than the $26.6 billion 
received in 1990. Most of the benefits of aid were lost through debt servicing, which 
amounted to $22 billion in 2002.96
This experience is not limited to cotton, but extends to the raw-material base of Sub- 
Saharan African States. Little wonder that ‘Fair Trade Stalls’ and products are among 
the fastest growing business in Western Europe.97 This can be explained in part by the 
‘information generation’ created by advances in technology in the last half century. 
Nonetheless, it also appears to point to the quest for social justice among informed 
citizens of the rich northern hemisphere, who are constantly organising and agitating 
for their governments to pursue fairer deals for children, farmers and workers of 
disadvantaged parts of the world that their governments have dealings with.98
The question of the link between trade liberalisation with so-called non-trade issues 
has only just begun to be examined.99 It raises social justice issues that comprise the 
core of the jurisdiction of ILO.100 Social justice is that which people generally conceive 
to encapsulate fairness and justice. Miller writes:
Social justice has always been, and must always be, a critical idea, one that challenges us to 
reform our institutions and practices in the name of greater fairness.101
The link between the enterprises of WTO and those of ILO is often acknowledged 
in terms that emphasise apprehensions about the effects on developing countries of 
trade liberalisation.102 Subsequently, perceived international economic inequality; 
96 African Renewal, ‘New African Report Urges Industrial Notions to Play Fair’, www.un.org/
ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/newrels/eca_era_04.htm (last accessed 27 January 2008).
97 See, for example, Fair Trade Superstore, available at: http://fairtradeuk.org/; The Fairtrade 
Foundation, London, UK, available at: www.fairtrade.org.uk/ (last accessed 27 January 2008). 
See also Office of Government Commerce (UK) Guidance on Fair and Ethical Trading, available 
at: www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/Guidance_on_Fair_and_Ethical_Trading.pdf (last accessed 27 
January 2008).
98 The G8 now operates under immense international civil society pressure to alleviate poverty 
and suffering in Africa. See, for example, G8 Gleneagles 2005, ‘Progress Report by the G8 Africa 
Personal Representatives on Implementation of the Africa Action Plan’, available at: www.fco.gov.
uk/Files/kfile/PostG8_Gleneagles_AfricaProgressReport,0.pdf (last accessed 27 January 2008).
99 Questioning the utility to analysis of issues of the idea of linkages. See also Leebron, David W., 
‘Linkages’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2002, pp. 5–27, at p. 5. 
100 See ILO Constitution, supra 66. See also Treaty of Versailles, Articles 387–427 (Part XIII), 28 
June 1919, available also at University of San Diego website http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/
versaillestreaty/vercontents.html (last visited 27 January 2008).
101 Miller, David, Principles of Social Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. x. See also 
Schmidtz, David, The Elements of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, Chapter 
1; Williams, Andrew, Social Justice, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, Chapters 1–3; Rawls, John, A 
Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, rev. ed., 1999, pp. 52–78; and Dworkin, Ronald, 
Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, 1991, Chapter 6.
102 E.g., Torres, op.cit. (note 56).
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deterioration of labour protection across the world; and global economic instability 
are all attributed to trade liberalisation. This creates also the danger that perfectly 
legitimate concerns could be enthroned to the status of well-established facts. Instead 
of them being treated with caution, they then become pillars on which political 
pressures that are unfavourable to trade liberalisation, are mounted, regardless of 
their veracity.103
However, in an invaluable empirical study on jobs and incomes in a globalising 
world, Ghose104 found that the deficiencies of the policy of trade liberalisation are 
not self-evident and that such impressions can be wrong. For instance, the commonly 
held view among economists is that trade liberalisation has pitted unskilled workers 
of the regions of the world against one another. One result of this situation is that 
employers can easily relocate their businesses to the region offering them the most 
advantage. Often employers are influenced by among other things, the cost of labour 
and the legal protections afforded to labour.
The lower the cost of labour and the less tenuous the legal protection available to 
the labour force, the more attractive is the proposition of switching business to another 
region unless the labour lacks the required skills and the cost of shipping goods to the 
markets makes the relocation economically unwise. Therefore, unskilled workers in 
the industrialised world have to face declining real wages or risk unemployment, or 
both. Nonetheless, empirical research is yet to establish that such trends have been 
generated by the growth of trade with the developing world.105 Consequently, the link 
between trade liberalisation and marginalisation of African economies is at the very 
least problematic and deserving of scrutiny rather than summation in sound bites.
3.7. THE MARGINALISATION OF SUB-SAHARA AFRICAN STATES 
UNDER THE WTO REGIME
The prognosis on Sub-Saharan African economies in the last ten dozen years begs 
policy questions at various levels, all of which reflect its status. At the domestic level, 
the primary question is about governance. This is because governments that insist 
on collecting taxes, but refuse to account to the electorate, have never created strong, 
competitive and sustainable economies.
103 Ghose, loc.cit. (note 61), at p. 281. Discussing how misconceptions of GATT as an institution and 
WTO as a constitution fed the illusion that the latter had a legitimacy and authority it might 
otherwise not have, and is a mere treaty based on organisation. See also Cass, Deborah Z., The 
Constitutionalisation of the World Trade Organisation: Legitimacy, Democracy and Community 
in the International Trading System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 63. Discussing the 
institutional character of the modern international trading system, See also Jackson, John H., The 
World Trading System, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 58.
104 Ghose, op.cit. (note 40). 
105 Ghose, loc.cit. (note 61), at p. 282.
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At the regional level, the key issue refers to the physical, economic and social 
security of individuals on the continent. Economic oriented migration by Africans 
to other geographic regions of the world is a good indicator of the present welfare of 
citizens on the continent. A disproportionate number of African born and trained 
professionals, including medical physicists, dentists, nurses, engineers and teachers 
practice their vocations in Western Europe, while Africa manifestly evidences a lack 
of similarly skilled personnel.
At the international level, the key issue is whether Sub Saharan Africa could 
achieve the MDGs by the target date of 2015 under the WTO trade liberalisation 
wealth maximisation regime that bears no responsibility for the unequal distribution 
of the wealth and hardships that the system creates.
In spite of the fact that no region has yet made economic gains while disjointed 
from the world economy, research shows that the one international economic sphere 
in which Africa has remained unmarginalised is that of international aid.106 It 
shows also that Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of trade and investment has declined to 
insignificance.107 Exceptionally, the volume of Africa’s exports has grown less rapidly 
than gross domestic product (GDP).108 Sub-Saharan Africa has not participated in 
the substantial international growth in foreign direct and equity investment.109 A 
proportion of GDP private investment is lower in Africa than in other regions and is 
in decline.110
But should this prognosis be attributed to trade liberalisation? Ghose111 examined 
several factors that underpin this prognosis and concluded that there was not 
enough evidence to indict the current trade liberalisation project with marginalising 
developing countries’ economies.
One factor is the all too often casually assumed link between international GDP 
which WTO seeks to grow in its campaign to maximise wealth creation on the one 
hand, and the status of Africa’s GDP at the same time. Ghose found that the movement 
in the share of world exports in world GDP in the period 1960–1996 showed a steady, 
rising trend for the entire period. However, there was no noticeable deviation from 
that trend in the 1980s, when some States began to liberalise their economies, nor 
in the 1990s when that liberalisation was gaining momentum. In fact, in the same 
period, world GDP actually declined (see below, figure 3.7.1).
106 Collier, loc.cit. (note 93), at p. 541.
107 Idem.
108 Idem.
109 Lall, Sanjaya, ‘Employment and Foreign Investment: Policy Options for Developing Countries’, 
International Labour Review, Vol. 134, No. 4–5, 1995, pp. 541–557, at p. 541.
110 Collier, loc.cit. (note 93), at p. 541.
111 Ghose, loc.cit. (note 61), at p. 282.
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figure 3.7.1. Corresponding decline in average annual growth rate of world GDP as states 
began to deepen economic liberalisation
Time Frame Average Annual Growth Rate of World GDP
1 1960–1970 5.3%
2 1970–1980 3.5%
3 1980–1990 3.1%
4 1990–1997 2.3%
This evidence disproves any claims of leaps in world trade since the early 1980s when 
States began to deepen economic integration and some Sub-Saharan African States 
were beginning to implement economic structural adjustment programmes intended 
to stimulate their trade mainly through trade liberalisation. Therefore, based on 
this point alone, it could not be said that the current trade liberalisation project was 
culpable for the marginalisation of African States from the world economy.
Ghose112 examined the share of exports in GDP for industrialised and developing 
countries in 1980 and then in 1995. He found that in 1980 the share of industrialised 
States was 19.6 percent, dropping 0.3 percent in 1995. This contrasts significantly with 
the experience of developing countries whose share rose from 23.4 percent in 1980 to 
29.9 percent in 1995.
The possible explanations for this difference favour the view that the current trade 
liberalisation project is a double edged sword that industrialised States are more skilful 
at applying than developing States because first of all, the reliance by industrialised 
States on NTBs and subsidies leads to a protection of their domestic markets from 
competition of produce from developing countries’ agrarian markets. Thus, while 
they have opened up their own markets to competition from industrialised States, 
developing States appear in the main to have obtained only an illusory corresponding 
comparable advantage. This reality has compelled them to increase their trade 
orientation while that of industrialised States has remained unaffected.
Secondly, the current trade liberalisation project began earlier for industrialised 
States and much later for developing States so that further liberalisation under the 
WTO did not require as much trade orientation for the former group of States as 
it did for the latter group. Research shows that the proportion of total merchandise 
exports for industrialised States with each other was static throughout the period 
between 1980–1996, suggesting ‘the liberalising efforts of developing countries had 
little impact on the tendency of the industrialised countries to trade mainly among 
themselves.’113
In its short history so far, the current trade liberalisation project could be credited 
with having achieved a number of positive statistical economic outcomes only if the 
112 Ibidem, at p. 285.
113 Idem.
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question is not asked about whether it is justifiable to allocate and minimise economic 
activity of States according to geographic, historic and aspirational location. The WTO’s 
non-tariff barrier (NTB) and subsidy regimes are both capable of restricting economic 
activity of developing States to only what developed States are happy for them to do. In 
this sense, developing member States parties of the WTO are the children of the WTO 
family, and developed States the elders who bear authority over the rest.
This possibility has the potential to skew international trade by effectively wiping 
out any real advantage that the primary producers should obtain. Developing States 
appear to be most affected because of the monolithic inclinations of most of their 
economies. Nonetheless, such an outcome would have occurred anyway, even without 
the current trade liberalisation project because it is the WTO’s failure to ensure 
genuine trade liberalisation in commodities that are the mainstay of the developing 
States’ economies that has marginalised this group of States from any benefits of trade 
liberalisation. In this sense, the problem is not with the idea of trade liberalisation 
itself, but with disingenuous trade liberalisation.
The problem of unequal trade under the WTO paradigm stifles, instead of 
stimulating economic growth, and threatens countries whose primary exports are 
blocked by NTBs and subsidy regimes with growing problems of workless, no income, 
frustrated communities that need but cannot afford the manufactures of manufacturing 
economies. Whatever its virtues, such an economic system portrays graphically the 
international social injustice that may result and facilitate the commission of such 
international crimes as illegal economic migration, people trafficking, and many 
others in both the industrialised and the developing countries. More importantly it 
threatens realisation of the MDGs by 2015.
Section 4 of this article makes the case that the benefits of WTO inspired gross 
international wealth maximisation could be harmonised with UN aspirations 
including the goal of realising the MDGs by 2015 only if ILO ethics are allowed to 
affect the current WTO sponsored trade liberalisation project. This can be achieved 
by deliberate and purposive departures from extreme wealth maximisation to a 
reasonable wealth maximisation that is sensitive to domestic, local and universal 
concerns on the one hand, and continued support of such WTO adjustment by the 
UN on the other.
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4. INEQUALITY AND THE QUESTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
4.1. SOME TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONS
The ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization’s114 point of 
departure is a classical human rights argument that human beings everywhere share a 
common humanity regardless of their localised appreciation or understanding of that 
fact.115 That the common dignity of individuals ought to be recognised, promoted and 
ensured for individuals everywhere. This also is the purpose of the MDGs, which seek 
to mobilise support for human development in order to guarantee eight human rights 
standards for individuals everywhere. Therefore, there is an apparent connection 
between the goals of the UN as international vision caster of our times116 and ILO as 
social justice curator of the world.117 But the link ends there.
The international vision caster for the welfare and security of individuals 
everywhere and its social justice agitator alone cannot achieve their goals of human 
development with social justice without the support of the international trading 
system. Money has to be made to service both their goals.
The absence of this vital connection raises the question of the utility of an 
international trading system that is premised on the classic absolute, comparative 
advantage model if it disconnects its benefits from the welfare of the majority of 
citizens of the world. That question is encouraged by the failure of the system to 
facilitate the creation of decent jobs, provide for health insurance and basic education 
everywhere.118 International systems court legitimacy difficulties for themselves and 
risk disrepute when they are applied to harness global resources to the service of 
creating wealth from which the rest of the world is then alienated, and a handful of 
individuals in a few countries set to benefit – a subtle and legitimate slavery of the 
majority by the powerful minority.
114 This Commission was established by ILO to examine the phenomenon of globalisation, its dynamic, 
governance and impact on individuals everywhere and to recommend a strategy for social inclusion 
of everyone so that many and few could tap into the benefits of that phenomenon. In 2004, the 
Commission published its report under the title of ‘A Fair Globalization, Creating Opportunities 
for all’; World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, loc.cit. (note 18). 
115 Discussing the nature of human rights and the relativist/universalist dichotomy, see Donnelly, Jack, 
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2nd ed., 2003. 
See also Chigara, Ben, Amnesty in International Law: Legality under International Law of National 
Amnesty Laws, Longman, Harlow, 2002. 
116 Although it is often castigated for being a cumbersome, unwieldy and often inefficient organisation 
in need of reform. See Alston, Philip, ‘The Myopia of Handmaidens: International Lawyers and 
Globalization’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1997, pp. 435–448. See 
also Reisman, Michael, ‘Designing and Managing the Future of the State’, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1997, pp. 409–420.
117 The ILO and refugees, immigrant workers, HIV sufferers, and so on.
118 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, loc.cit. (note 18). 
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The international wealth that results from States’ adherence to WTO international 
trade policies that: (i) minimise State protection of domestic social and political 
instability; and (ii) rely on strategies that perhaps unintentionally export domestic 
social economic difficulties and threaten global stability119 ends up in the hands of a 
few individuals in a few States. Even to the unreasonable person, this cannot be right. 
This itself is the epicentre of modern denial of human rights. Unless reform occurs 
in the international trading system, efforts to achieve the MDGs by the target date of 
2015 will remain both hollow and disingenuous particularly for Sub-Saharan Africa.
On an elementary level, the reform could subject WTO policies to the UN’s 
human security and development goals that seek to improve the welfare of individuals 
everywhere, especially through the development of the human rights project. This is 
because the international trading system depends upon people as workers that create 
international wealth, and again depends on people as markets for its produce. Remove 
people in either capacity or both and the international trading system becomes 
dysfunctional or obsolete. For this reason, the goals of the international trading system 
and its policies should be made to tally with those of the UN as global vision caster.
That does not appear to be the case at the moment.120 Global gini-coefficients 
point largely to a clear failure of the national economic systems of more than 
80 percent of the world population to avert the social trauma and human insecurity 
that accompany economic insecurity. This picture is an inadvertent indictment of the 
modern international trading multilateral trading regime that champions the classic 
insights of absolute and comparative advantage economic theory developed by Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo, because affected States are member States parties of the 
multilateral WTO trading systems which is championing trade liberalisation. WTO’s 
woes with legitimacy derive from the following:
– Findings of the UN bodies regarding human development vis-à-vis actual gross 
international economic wealth creation and real economic inequality within 
and between States. This is due largely to WTO’s assumption that, if the rich are 
allowed to get even richer, economic benefits will move downward to the poor. 
Apparently this is not borne out by the facts. Therefore, this may be the most 
pretentious premise of the current WTO sponsored trade liberalisation project.
– Gini-coefficient test results, which point to a great potential social unrest because 
of the wide prevalence and extent of economic inequality within and between 
States. According to Vulliamy, even the US is in denial about economic inequality. 
‘For the first time in ten years the number of people caught in the poverty trap has 
suddenly increased. Unemployment is up from 4.2 per cent in 2000 to 5.7 per cent 
last year. While the middle class shrinks, the numbers living below the official 
119 A fundamental assumption of the modern international trading regime. See Howse, loc.cit. (note 
15), at p. 95.
120 See Martens, loc.cit. (note 29). See also UNDP, loc.cit. (note 29).
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poverty line of $18,104 a year for a family of four has shot up to thirty-three million 
– from 11.3 to 11.7 per cent. That’s the first increase since 1992. While President 
Bush’s windfall tax breaks to the super-rich breezed through Congress (with 
Democratic help), the proposed rise in the minimum wage is frozen.’121 Further, 
the proportion of children without health cover has increased from 63.8 percent 
to 67.1 percent. The poverty rate for children in the US is worse than in 19 ‘rich’ 
countries, according to a study by the University of Michigan.122
– Its failure to attend to questions of unequal distribution of the gross international 
wealth that results from states’ adherence to its trading regime raises the question 
of whether it is not culpably negligent of attending to questions of unequal 
distribution of the social power that it helps establish through the wealth it creates 
and leaves in the hands of a few people in a small number of countries. This has 
the potential of conflicting the WTO output with the UN focus as global vision 
caster for economic and human development.123 The MDGs are the UN’s foremost 
concern at the moment. However, the unintended worst possible effects of trade 
liberalisation may kill any hope for their realisation, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa where progress towards these goals is threatened also by decimation of 
populations through the AIDS pandemic, poor political governance and civil 
conflicts.
Therefore, there is a need, to refocus the WTO trading system so that its outputs 
simultaneously and deliberately facilitate UN goals and not undermine them. This 
calls first for an acknowledgment and rebuttal of the false premise that, if the rich 
are allowed to get even richer, economic benefits will trickle downward to the poor. 
This is the blind spot in the classic insights of absolute and comparative advantage 
economic theory. This can be achieved for instance by introducing a space for the ILO 
proven tools of social dialogue along the tripartite124 dimension to involve employer, 
employee and government representatives in the management of economic issues that 
affect people everywhere.125
As a policy, tripartism requires that all stakeholders within and between 
nation-States engage in social dialogue whenever matters referring to policy and 
121 ‘US in Denial as Poverty Rises’, Guardian Unlimited (UK), 3 November 2002, www.guardian.co.uk/
usa/story/0,825149,00.html (last accessed 27 January 2008).
122 Idem.
123 Since its inception the UN has championed development and protection of human rights standards, 
mobilised States’ efforts to achieve economic and human development especially through the first, 
second and third UN development decades – 1960s, 1970s and 1980s respectively. Somavia regards 
the UN as the pillar of international co-operation for social development. See Somavia, Juan, 
People’s Security: Globalizing Social Progress, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1999, p. 45. 
124 See generally Trebilcock, Anne et al., Towards Social Dialogue: Tripartite Co-operation in National 
Economic and Social Policy-making, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1994, p. 3. 
125 See generally Torres, op.cit. (note 56), at pp. 51–66. See also Somavia, op.cit. (note 123).
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standard setting fall for consideration. In other words, no policy change could be 
inaugurated or effected, or new standards developed and implemented without 
the participation at both national and international level of the governments,’ 
employers’ and workers’ representatives. This would go a long way to address unequal 
distribution of social power based economic inequality within and between States. It 
would eventually ensure that strategies are developed within the international trading 
system that put distribution at the centre so that the wealth that results from States’ 
adherence to the WTO trading system begins to accrue to many and not the current 
few.126 This is because a major criticism of the UNDP Annual Report (2005) is that 
unequal distribution of social power in the modern international trading system has 
left the distribution of the gross international wealth of the system in the hands of the 
few and not the many.
The WTO’s focus on markets appears to be both rigid and limited, because 
it focuses on artificial entities that are driven in part by people themselves. People 
predate and determine the existence and longevity of markets and not vice versa. The 
slave market was created by people and extinguished by the same species. Thus, the 
issue that the WTO ought to resolve, is both immediate and fundamental because it is 
critical to its own continuance.
Human beings are real, ready and resilient. It is in their nature to fight back against 
the scourge of disease, disaster and domination of any sort. However, markets are 
artificial creations of the powerful in society. They come and go as do their instigators. 
Often they extinguish themselves through inefficiency and/or illegitimacy. The 
economies of over 50 countries have deteriorated from when they first took up 
membership of the WTO. This has hastened perceptions of a legitimacy deficit in the 
multilateral WTO trading system.
This perception is supported also by the growth in Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) as an alternative to the WTO multilateral trading regime. RTAS are defined as 
bilateral, trilateral or multilateral trading arrangements between States. Their design 
can take several forms including Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs), Economic Communities (ECs) and Development Communities 
(DCs). However, their purpose is always the same, i.e. to create sectoral trading 
relations.
Ng’ong’ola127 writes that member States parties of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) that was established in 1992, are parties to at least 
two RTAs. This is deliberate and not accidental because in spite of the specific benefits 
126 A major criticism of the UNDP Annual report (2005) is that unequal distribution of social power in 
the modern international trading system has left the distribution of the gross international wealth 
of the system in the hands of the few while the majority go without. 
127 Ng’ong’ola, Clement, ‘Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in the Southern African 
Development Community’, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2000, pp. 485–506, 
at p. 485.
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that individual RTAs128 may contribute to international trade, the sum of their practice 
tends to undermine the institutional and economic development of the multilateral 
trade system. Specifically, RTAs are an institutional threat to the WTO.129
Successive failures of WTO Ministerial negotiations have shown that RTAs 
undermine the integrity of the multilateral system by draining States’ enthusiasm 
for, and confidence in multilateral trade negotiations. Secondly, they create conflicts 
between RTAs and the WTO. For instance, RTAs are historically discriminatory. 
In this sense, they are counter to the non-discriminatory ethos of the WTO regime 
that is ensured by the MFN and NT principles. Third, they deplete States’ energy and 
resources between WTO and RTA processes. Picker130 writes that these institutional 
harms are interrelated and self-reinforcing. More than half of all RTAs have been 
negotiated within the lifetime of the WTO. The WTO writes that
[t]he vast majority of WTO members are party to one or more regional trade agreements. 
The surge in RTAs has continued unabated since the early 1990s. Some 250 RTAs have 
been notified to the GATT/WTO up to December 2002, of which 130 were notified after 
January 1995. Over 170 RTAs are currently in force; an additional 70 are estimated to be 
operational although not yet notified. By the end of 2005, if RTAs reportedly planned or 
already under negotiation are concluded, the total number of RTAs in force might well 
approach 300.131
The irresistible question to ask becomes: what motivates the same member States 
parties of the multilateral WTO trading system to resort also to RTAs? Globalisation; 
continuing colonial associations; the desire to enhance regional security, competitive 
advantages, support and cooperation; and furthering of economic and foreign policy 
goals are often cited reasons for this development.132
The overwhelming view133 is that recovery of the WTO’s diminishing integrity lies 
in the organisation’s willingness to extend its benefits to the majority of individuals 
everywhere and not the current tiny minority in the Western world – something that 
WTO clearly has not factored into its blueprint. It is also argued that its focus should 
be on people and on globalisation with solidarity that contributes to the elimination 
of poverty,134 rather than on its current obsession with markets. Disillusionment 
with WTO’s failure to ensure this is one way of interpreting the growing resort 
128 See Picker, Colin B., ‘Regional Trade Agreements v. the WTO: A Proposal for Reform of Article 
XXIV to Counter This Institutional Threat’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Law, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2005, pp. 267–319, at pp. 273–275.
129 Ibidem, at p. 270.
130 Ibidem, at p. 271.
131 WTO Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, available at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/
region_e.htm (last accessed 27 January 2008).
132 See Picker, loc.cit. (note 128), at pp. 273–279.
133 Too numerous to list, but see UNDP, loc.cit. (note 29), for the particular views.
134 Ibidem, at pp. 5–6.
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by States to regional and bilateral trade agreements in spite of the overwhelming 
endorsement of the multilateral trading system as shown by the high membership of 
the organisation.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Aggregation of the social impact of trade liberalisation shows that it has been an 
instrument of social progress in that it has created wealth, expanded opportunities 
and provided a nurturing environment for entrepreneurship and enterprise135 for 
some individuals within specific countries, and also for some countries within specific 
regions and for some regions of the world but not for all. It shows also that it has so 
far been an instrument for the institutionalisation of global social crisis in that it has 
ensured unemployment, poverty, and marginalisation for the majority of the world’s 
people, nation-States and regional groups.136 This outcome spells the greatest tragedy 
for the world’s weakest economic region by any standard – Sub-Saharan Africa. It also 
spells a legitimacy crisis for the current WTO sponsored trade liberalisation project. 
More importantly, it threatens the credibility of the UN as the global vision caster in 
that it appears to diminish the possibility of achieving the UN MDGs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa by the target date of 2015.
This article examined in particular the possible impact of the current WTO 
sponsored trade liberalisation project on Sub-Saharan Africa’s potential to achieve the 
MDGs by the target date of 2015. The article showed that the current WTO sponsored 
trade liberalisation project is nurturing and strengthening economic inequalities 
between and within economic regions of the world and also between and within States 
themselves without making any attempt institutionally to mitigate them.
This scenario is unacceptable because ultimately, it is a threat to both the 
establishment and maintenance of international peace and security. The article 
recommends first, the adoption by WTO of institutional and policy interventions 
that target the offsetting in Sub-Saharan Africa of the unintended worst possible 
effects of the current WTO sponsored trade liberalisation project. In this connection, 
WTO needs to adopt and implement measures that ameliorate, reduce and prevent 
as much as is humanely possible, the occurrence and nurturing of social injustice in 
the pursuit of wealth maximisation. Secondly, WTO could also adopt and implement 
measures that seek to facilitate the redistribution of the wealth that results from states’ 
adherence to its policies. WTO’s current insatiable obsession with seeking to maximise 
gross international wealth is dislocated from concerns about the distribution of that 
wealth. The presumption that once created the wealth will necessarily trickle down to 
the needy poor is illusory, catastrophic and irresponsible.
135 See also Gunter and Van der Hoeven, loc.cit. (note 5), at p. 17.
136 Idem.
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Thirdly, this could be facilitated by ILO monitoring of the WTO enterprise, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa to ensure social justice for people of that region. 
This should include ILO training and offering of direct guidance and assistance to 
government departments and officials of Sub-Saharan African States on such matters 
as negotiation, reception and management of foreign direct and indirect investment 
schemes, and ensuring that foreign investors observe the minimum industrial 
relations policies enjoyed by workers in the developed world. In this sense, ILO would 
become the broker and insurer of equal dignity of labour for Sub-Saharan African 
workers. These changes should increase the chances of the UN to achieve its MDGs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa by the target date of 2015.
This article examined the prospect in general of securing the economic welfare of 
African people, which appears for the moment to lie on the continuum between WTO 
and ILO pursuits. It showed that the agendas of the WTO and the ILO present the most 
acute ideological contrast in modern international law. They each declare immutable 
principles that set off the battle for the soul of individual Africans’ economic welfare. 
Failure by stakeholders to identify and deal with the challenges this raises is a sure 
catalyst for problems that others have conveniently classified as non-trade issues. The 
resolution of the appearance of tension between the enterprises of WTO on the one 
hand and ILO on the other may be the key to achieving the UN MDGs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa by the target date of 2015.
